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Abstract 
The paper is motivated by an apparent paradox – boys seem to participate more both in the 
labour market and in school than girls. This pattern breaks down once we take the household 
work done by girls into account. In this paper, we find that there is symmetry between the 
factors that make women’s contribution to the household economy less ‘visible’ than men’s and 
the factors that reduce girl’s involvement in outside work. Both are related to the kind of socio-
cultural environment in which households operate in India. Analysing the School, Work and 
household chores options for girls, we find that the kinship system prevalent in different regions 
as well as amongst different religions and castes is a significant determinant of these choices. In 
addition, we find that increases in household income do not decrease the probability of girls 
doing household chores, reinforcing our conclusion that non-economic factors are important. 
Our results confirm, once again, that while daughter’s labour complements mother’s work 
within family enterprises, it substitutes for mothers in household chores when the mother works 
outside the home.  
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Much of the literature concerning the time allocation of girls between school and work 
concludes that ‘girls are less likely to work than boys and also less likely to go to school’ (Deb 
and Rosati, 2002), giving rise to the term ‘the nowhere children’. However, this clearly 
contradicts sociological and anthropological studies which chart, in detail, the work done by 
girls within households in the developing world. Nieuwenhuys (1996), for instance, estimated 
that in India alone more than 100 million children (both boys and girls) were engaged in unpaid 
domestic labour. In general, while girls were expected to help their mothers in maintaining 
family well-being, boys were expected to help in income generating activities. Nieuwenhuys 
(1996) calculates that boys spent approximately 5 hours in domestic and non-waged labour and 
girls spent 6.5 hours a day in such work.  
 
This apparent contradiction arises, partly at least, because of the different definitions of work 
used in the literature. While the Economics literature concentrates on paid work for which data 
is more easily available, the sociological and anthropological literature considers all work (both 
paid and unpaid) done by children. Within the Economics literature, therefore, two main options 
– work and school – are considered, though from time to time, there are references to a third 
(neither work nor school) category. Very few papers, however, have explicitly modelled this 
residual category (Duraiswamy, 2000) though many writers recognise that this ‘no activity’ 
category may ‘correspond to heavy engagement in domestic chores’ (Bhalotra, 2000). Bhalotra 
(2000) therefore argues that the ‘existence of the no-activity category underlines the fact that 
one needs to be careful about assuming that actions which release children from work will also 
put them in school’. Some researchers (Assaad et al, 2002) aggregate household work with 
market work. However, given the different factors determining these two types of work as well 
as the gender of those undertaking each type of activity, the results obtained are likely to be very 
hard to interpret.  
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In this paper, therefore, we take a step away from the existing literature and explicitly model the 
contribution that girls make to the rural economy in India through their involvement in 
household chores. We model this in the context of the very different institutional and familial 
arrangements for girl children prevalent in different parts of India. We find that it is not that 
girls do much less than boys but that they do very different types of activities than boys. Thus, 
girls in rural India are more likely to be involved in household chores than in work outside the 
home. Analysing the reasons for this within a multivariate probit model, we find that the 
patriarchal kinship system is a significant factor as are household income levels and mother’s 
employment and wages, for example. 
 
The paper makes three main contributions to the literature. The first contribution, as detailed 
above, is in the approach adopted. We estimate  household chores as an explicit, alternate choice 
to school and paid work for girls. As far as we are aware, this is the first explicit analysis of the 
determinants of the work done by girls. Given that girls are more involved in unpaid work 
within the household than in paid work outside the home, our approach avoids the bias that 
could arise from subsuming chores into the work category. The approach allows for the 
possibility that the same factors may have quite different effects on the probability of work and 
chores. Thus, a socio-cultural environment, which decreases female independence outside the 
home, could reinforce the probability of girls doing household chores but would certainly not 
increase their probability of working outside the home. We test this separation between paid and 
unpaid work using a likelihood ratio test in this paper. 
 
Second, this is the first paper, to our knowledge that brings together the literature on kinship 
systems with that on child work. Given that our primary concern in the paper is the role of the 
girl child and given very different attitudes and norms towards the freedom of, and expectations 
from, girl children in India, it is very likely that attendance in school as well as involvement of 
girl children in work inside and outside the home will vary across India. In this paper, we make 
use of Dyson and Moore’s (1983) categorisation of Indian states based on their kinship systems 
to consider whether the role played by girl children in rural India is influenced by patriarchy. 
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Third, most literature to date (Duraiswamy, 2000; Cigno and Rosati, 2000) has used the 
multinomial logit (MNL) model in estimating the various choice alternatives for children. 
However this model, though computationally straightforward, assumes that the alternatives 
(SCHOOL, WORK, CHORES)
2 are independent of each other so that the relative probabilities 
are also independent of each other. This is a very restrictive assumption and has not, to our 
knowledge, been explicitly tested. In this paper we estimate both the multinomial logit (MNL) 
and the multivariate probit (MVP) models and test the appropriateness of the former using the 
Hausman test. This test rejects the MNL methodology, as we will see. We therefore concentrate 
on the MVP model which does not make very restrictive assumptions but is computationally 
more complicated.  
 
II. Background  
Our analysis is grounded in Becker’s framework of household utility maximisation, which is 
often used to analyse the work-schooling decisions of children. Individuals within this 
framework maximise utility over a lifetime and the household is seen as a single decision 
making unit within which parents are altruistic and therefore will consider the best interests of 
their children when making decisions. The framework also assumes perfect credit and insurance 
markets that enable families to borrow against the future and thus smooth consumption over 
their lifetimes and maximise utility.  
 
Within Becker’s framework, parents will invest in each child in such a way as to maximise the 
expected wealth of the entire family and this may mean greater investment in some children 
(older children/boys), while providing compensatory transfers to others (eg. younger children or 
girls
3) to equalise welfare across children. An analysis of the existing literature reveals that two 
broad factors can be identified as determining which children are invested in – the comparative 
advantage of each child in different jobs and sibling rivalry.  
 
                                                 
2 Most papers to date have estimated it with four alternatives (SCHOOL; WORK; SCHOOL AND WORK; 
NEITHER SCHOOL NOR WORK). 
3 Dowries are often seen in terms of such compensatory transfers in a context where returns to education are 
different between girls and boys.   5
Edmonds (2002) argues that if the returns to education for each child are the same and if child 
i’s marginal product in household production is higher than child j’s marginal product, then 
child i will devote more time to household production. Relaxing the assumption of equal returns 
to education for all children will reinforce this result, so that when the returns to education for 
boys are greater (see Kingdon and Unni, 2001; Duraiswamy, 2000) than the returns for girls, 
then the comparative advantage of boys in education is further reinforced.  
 
The comparative advantage of children in various activities need not be determined by purely 
monetary factors. It is likely, for instance, that the socio-cultural environment in which a child 
lives will determine its relative advantage in different activities. Many writers argue that the fact 
that girls get married and leave their natal home in India implies that the returns to parents from 
girl’s education will be lower. This is reflected in a common saying in India, ‘educating 
daughters is like planting seeds in a neighbour’s field’. Dyson and Moore (1983, p.44), in their 
study of kinship patterns in India suggest that, ‘because women are out-marriers, parents can 
expect little help from their daughters after marriage, whereas sons will remain at home’. Any 
investment in boys therefore helps maximise household lifetime utility whereas investment in 
girls leaks out to another household. 
 
Followed to its logical conclusion, such a pattern of costs and benefits should lead parents to 
invest in a boy’s education and to send girls out into the labour market (a practice that is 
common in many parts of East and South East Asia (Parrish and Willis, 1993)). In South Asia, 
however, this does not happen because the patriarchal kinship system also dictates that family 
honour may depend on the priority of patriarchal descent, which is ensured by secluding 
women, curtailing their activities outside the house and marrying them off at very young ages 
(Kishor, 1993, p248). Such a kinship system makes parents fearful of exposing girls to outside 
influences and therefore reduces the returns to both education and employment, while increasing 
the returns to proficiency in household chores (including an increase in the probability of 
marriage). Bennett (1992), for instance, argues that there is a clear ‘inside-outside’ demarcation 
with respect to activities undertaken by household members in India. ‘The marketplace, 
‘outside’, where livelihoods are earned and economic and political power transacted, is 
perceived to be a predominantly male domain,’ (p.1). This affects the kinds of jobs women seek   6
and for which they are considered suitable. It will also influence whether families consider it 
appropriate to send girls out to school or work. In this context, an important discriminating 
factor is also whether the work being done is for the family or for the market
4.  
 
This, however, would not be true throughout India, given the different kinship systems prevalent 
in different regions of the country (see Section III.3) and amongst different castes and religions. 
Kabeer (2003) argues that the ideal-typical household based on patriarchy-patriliny-patrilocality 
occurs most frequently in the Northern plains of India, among Muslim groups, Caste Hindus and 
landowning classes (p.116). With the South Indian system being so different, Dyson and Moore 
(1983) suggest that India is the meeting point between two socio-economic world formations – a 
‘West Asian’ kinship system characterising the Northern plains and the more egalitarian South 
East Asian kinship system in the South (Kabeer, 2003). This could be why the participation of 
girls both in schooling and in the labour market (Kambhampati and Rajan, 2004b) is higher in 
South India than in North India. An interesting aspect of such a time allocation is that it would 
not be particularly related to household income because however well off the family, they would 
be unlikely to send girls out of their homes.  
 
Another argument has been put forward to explain why even amongst children of the same 
gender and family, some are more disadvantaged than others. In our present context, this 
argument can explain both why girls are at a disadvantage and also why amongst girl children, 
certain children (eg. the eldest) are at a further disadvantage. The argument articulated by Garg 
and Morduch (1998) states that a combination of time and budget constraints together with the 
household composition set up patterns of underinvestment in human capital. In the standard 
household model, parents invest in each child until marginal revenue from such investment is 
equal to marginal costs. In the presence of budget constraints, however, marginal revenue to 
such investment is usually greater than the marginal costs of such investment and therefore 
rivalry will develop between children for resources ‘even in the absence of strategic behaviour 
by any family members’ (p.3). Garg and Morduch (1998) therefore conclude that since boys 
                                                 
4 We distinguish between inside and outside work for women by including 2 separate variables for mother’s 
employment – MOTHER_SELFEMP (which indicates mothers whoa re employed in family enterprises and on 
family farms) and MOTHER_EMPLOY (which indicates mothers employed outside the home). This distinction 
between work done inside and outside the home is also reflected in the visibility of female work relative to male. 
Sen (1980) argues that this, in turn, decreases female bargaining power within households.   7
have higher returns to education they get more resources. They also find, for instance, that a 
child who only has sisters is 50% more likely to be in secondary school than a similar child with 
brothers. This is also true for standard health measures. While brothers may provide some 
benefit by increasing the pool of resources to be allocated, this is only likely to occur in the 
future.  
 
The comparative advantage and sibling rivalry explanations result in gender differences if one 
assumes that girls are better at household production, for example, and boys at outside work, 
and in birth order effects if one assumes that children get better at such work as they grow older. 
Thus, though many studies find that parents invest more (both in terms of time and money) in 
older children, these children will also usually be the first to move into paid labour (boys) and 
household production (girls), when the family is faced with budget and credit constraints 
(because of their relative comparative advantage in such activities). In this context, one may 
expect the oldest girl child to be doubly disadvantaged – both by her gender and by her birth 
order.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
III.1. Data 
The data are from the 50
th round of the household socio-economic survey, conducted by the 
National Sample Survey Organisation in India.  The dataset is large and complex and includes 
socio-economic information for 356,352 individuals belonging to 69,231 rural households 
across all the states and Union Territories in India. Since this round of the survey was focussed 
on consumer expenditure and employment and Schedule No.10 itself concentrates on education 
and employment issues, we have detailed information on the educational status and economic 
activity of members of each of the households in the survey. The dataset thus provides us with 
exhaustive information on the work and schooling status of children in these households, and 
the educational and employment status of their parents thereof. Our sample in this paper is 
restricted to 21130 girls between 10-15 years of age.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
   8
Table 1 considers the school and work experience of the oldest boy and girl children in each 
household. It indicates that while 74% of the oldest boys in our sample go to school, only about 
59% of oldest girls in a family go to school. Thus, significantly more boys (15% more) than 
girls go to school. While 8% of oldest girls work outside the home, 10% of oldest boys do and 
finally, and most tellingly, while 15% of oldest girls are engaged in household chores to the 
exclusion of school and paid work, only about 1% of oldest boys spend their entire time doing 
household chores.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Table 2 considers the level of educational achievement of children by birth order. We note that 
while 69% of first born girls have below primary level education (36% illiterate and 33% below 
primary), 81% of second borns and 89% of third borns have below primary education. 
Similarly, the figures are 60% for first borns, 79% for second- and 88% for third born boys. 
Thus, older children (both boys and girls) are more likely to attend school than children higher 
up the birth order. While 81% of second-born girls have below primary education, 79% of 
second-born boys have the same level of education. Thus, while a first-born girl has almost 10% 
chance of being in middle school, a second born girl has only 3% chance of this. The 
proportions are 13% and 3% for first and second born boys. The table also clearly reflects the 
gender bias in such educational participation. For all birth orders, a smaller proportion of girls is 
educated than of boys. Thus, while 69% of first-born girls has below primary level education, 
60% of first-born boys has the same level of education. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Table 3 analyses the type of household production activities that children are engaged in. It is 
clear that overwhelmingly more girls than boys are engaged in such work. In our sample, 4716 
girls said they were involved in household chores, while only 261 boys were involved in such 
work. Of the 261 boys who said they were engaged in household activities, 22% did kitchen 
garden duties, 40% collected fish, 56% collected firewood and 61% collected water. Contrast 
this with the 4716 girls who said they did household chores. The highest proportions were   9
involved in the collection of firewood (46%), preparation of dung cakes (53%) and carrying 
water (65%). Even in activities where boys proportionately did more work, like kitchen garden 
maintenance, there were more girls than boys involved.  
 
These statistics clearly indicate that while girls go less to school and work less outside the home 
than boys, they are far from idle. Their allocation between jobs inside and outside the home is 




The school-work decision of children has traditionally been considered using two approaches. 
The first, and now rather dated, approach was to aggregate work and the ‘neither’ category and 
to consider only two options - school and work (Rosenzweig, 1982; Rosenzweig and Wolpers, 
1982; Duraiswamy, 1988, 1992). Discussing this, Duraiswamy (2000) argues that if the decision 
to send children to work is the same as the decision to keep them at home doing household 
chores, then the two categories can be aggregated and the determinants of work and schooling 
can be considered within a dichotomous framework. The second approach, and a more popular 
one, has been to consider the school and work decisions explicitly within a multinomial logit 
(MNL) framework. Cigno and Rosati (2000), for instance, estimated 4 mutually exclusive 
categories (school, work, both and neither) within a multinomial logit framework and found that 
the ‘probability of falling in this ‘neither’ category is affected by the same explanatory variables 
as those that affect ‘work only’. They therefore draw the conclusion that the two must be the 
same.  
 
Neither of these approaches is acceptable. Aggregating paid and unpaid work will lead to a bias 
in the results especially if the factors influencing the two are very different. This is quite likely if 
boys dominate the paid work sample and girls dominate household chores, as most statistics 
indicate. On the other hand, analysing household chores (or unpaid work) as a residual 
(nowhere) category, as the MNL methodology has done, is also problematic because it includes 
those who are idle and therefore unwilling to work, disabled and therefore unable to work and 
finally those who are working but not counted as such. It also reinforces the negative notion that   10
these children are idle, rather than a more realistic and positive conception – they do household 
chores.  
 
In this paper, therefore, we analyse these choices within two frameworks – the multinomial logit 
and the multivariate probit methodologies. We extend the traditional MNL options to include 
household chores as a distinct option. Thus, our model has 5 separate options – school, work, 
household chores, Both and Neither. We begin by testing whether any of these options, 
specifically WORK and CHORES can be aggregated, as some earlier studies have done. To do 
this, we calculated a likelihood ratio between a restricted (combining the WORK and CHORES 
category) and an unrestricted model (5 separate choices: SCHOOL, WORK, CHORES, BOTH 
and NEITHER). Our test statistic rejects such an aggregation at the 1% level (with a chi-square 
value of 950.02 with 54 degrees of freedom). 
 
The MNL framework assumes that the error terms of the various choices are independent. This 
implies that the relative probabilities arising from the choices are independent of each other. It 
assumes, for instance, that the odds ratios derived from the model remain the same, irrespective 
of the number of choices considered (Maddala, 1983). However, this would be inappropriate 
when the options being considered eg. child work and domestic chores, are close substitutes. 
Clearly, neither the child nor its parents is likely to view the choice between work and chores as 
independent. Inclusion of such non-independent choices within a MNL model will result in the 
probabilities for those options being over-estimated.  
 
We tested this Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption on our 5-option MNL model 
using a Hausman test. The Hausman test hypothesises that if a subset of the choice set is truly 
irrelevant, omitting it from the model will not change the parameter estimates significantly. The 
results of this test are presented in Table 5. Three out of the 5 tests reject the null hypothesis that 
IIA assumption is valid. Our results therefore lead us to conclude that the MNL specification is 
not appropriate to analyse these choices.  
 
Insert Table 5 
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We therefore concentrate on the less restrictive multivariate probit model in what follows. Since 
it is a computationally more complicated model and can only deal with a limited number of 
alternatives, we restrict ourselves to the 3 options that are of direct interest to us – school, work 
and chores
5. In our case, the MVP methodology specifies a model of the following kind: 
Y1 = b1X1 + e1; y1 = 1 if y1* > 0, 0 otherwise. 
Y2 = b2X2 + e2; y2 = 1 if y2* > 0, 0 otherwise. 
Y3 = b3X3 + e3; y3 = 1 if y3* > 0, 0 otherwise. 
E(e1) = E(e2) = E(e3) = 0; var (e1) = var (e2) = var (e3) = 1; cov (e1, e2) = cov (e2, e3) = cov (e1, e3) 
= rho # 0. 
 
Here, y1 = SCHOOL, y2 = WORK and y3 = Household CHORES. X1, X2 and X3 are the vectors 
of the determinants of SCHOOL, WORK and CHORES respectively. Our three dependent 
variables are binary (0,1) variables. WORK is equal to 0, if the child does not work, otherwise it 
is equal to 1. Similarly, SCHOOL = 0 if the child does not go to school, otherwise it is equal to 
1 and CHORES = 0 if the child’s main activity is not household chores, otherwise it is equal to 
1. 
 
If the error terms of the equations within a MVP model are correlated, then rho will be 
significantly different from 0, necessitating estimation of the model as a simultaneous system. 
Alternatively, when rho = 0, the three equations are not correlated with each other and can be 
estimated as three separate univariate probit models. However, given that all of our dependent 
variables (SCHOOL, CHORES and WORK) are likely to be determined by very similar factors, 
it is likely that a multivariate probit model would, a priori, be more appropriate than 3 separate 
univariate probit estimations. Thus, family income, mother’s and father’s employment status 
and education as well as the age and gender of the child are likely to affect the probability of all 
3 options. In fact, in the past it was often argued that work was the inverse of schooling so that 
factors that increased the probability of work (WORK and CHORES), simultaneously decreased 
the probability of schooling (Grootaert, 1998). In this context, any variables left out of our 
                                                 
5 Note that there are very few children doing both (only 1532 in a total sample of 93825 children in the age group 5-
15 yrs do school and work or school and chores).   12
analysis will show up in the error terms of both equations, making them correlated (i.e. rho will 
be significant). 
 
Before we go any further, we need to define our dependent variables more precisely. In this 
paper, child work is said to occur when the principal activity of the child refers to any one of 
those activities, which are categorised as ‘employed’
6. When the principal activity of the child 
refers to attending educational institutions the child is categorised as going to School and when 
her principal activity refers to attending domestic duties only, she is classified as doing domestic 
chores (refer to appendix for detailed description of the variables). This classification is based 
on self-reporting of activities. Children who work and study or who do household chores and 
work are classified either within work or within school, depending on which they claim as their 
primary activity. Such a classification is useful because it enables us to consider the child’s 
primary activities in binary terms. However, it does not allow us to consider children who are 
multi-tasking. This does not seem to be a major problem in our sample because summary 
statistics indicate that a majority of the children (85% of boys and 71% of girls) who did some 
work worked full time i.e. 7 days a week.  
 
III.3. Empirical Methodology 
 
In this section, we will consider the hypotheses underlying our choice of independent variables 
in more detail. As indicated earlier, we test for the influence of a number of personal, family and 
community characteristics on the probability of schooling and of work for girls.  
 
In section III.1, we saw that household chores are significantly more important for girls than for 
boys. Section II related this to the possibility of lower rates of return to girls in the labour 
market and to their comparative advantage in homebound activities, which in turn is related to 
the socio-cultural environment in which the girls live. We hypothesised that in many parts of 
India parents are unwilling (except in extreme circumstances) to expose daughters to the ‘perils’ 
of the labour market because of the constraints set by the prevailing kinship system. India 
                                                 
6 Worked in household enterprises (paid and unpaid), salaried regular/wage employee, casual wage labourer in 
public and other works.  
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provides a good case in which to test this hypothesis because it has two (if not 3) clearly 
demarcated kinship systems with very different approaches to female independence and 
freedom. This was first articulated by Dyson and Moore (1983), who divided the country into 3 
separate kinship patterns – the North Indian System, the South Indian system and the East 
Indian System. Dyson and Moore (1983) identify 3 key aspects of the North Indian system, 
including spouses being unrelated in terms of kinship, males co-operating with and receiving 
help only from other males to whom they are related by blood and women not inheriting 
property. These kinship characteristics result in a system wherein groups of patrilineally related 
males rigidly control the sexuality of females within their groups through restrictions like 
‘purdah’, in order to maintain their honour, reputation and power. This has given rise to an 
environment in which girls have less freedom and are very carefully protected from outside 
influences. In this context, both school and paid work are viewed with suspicion, as being 
activities that take a girl outside the narrow confines of the home. In contrast, within the South 
Indian kinship system, spouses are often closely related (cross-cousins) to each other, there are 
close socio-economic relations between males who are related by blood and by marriage and 
women may inherit property. This results in a system wherein female chastity is less important 
and female movements are therefore less rigidly controlled. In the present context, therefore, it 
is likely that gender differences in school and work probabilities (even though they will continue 
to exist) will be less stark in South India than in North India. To proxy for such regional 
differences, we include two dummy variables (DMSouth and DMNorth) to distinguish the 
Southern states from the Northern ones on the basis of Dyson and Moore’s categorisation.  
 
Bennett (1992) argues that this is also true for castes in India. Thus, ‘lower caste and especially 
tribal groups place less emphasis on maintaining female sexual purity by restricting female 
contact with the public sphere’ (p.8). The inside-outside dichotomy is therefore weaker for 
females from these groups. We therefore include a caste (CASTE) variable that identifies 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes in India from others
7. In addition to varying across regions 
and castes, kinship systems will also vary according to religion. Thus, Kabeer (2003) argues that 
the patriarchal North Indian system is identified more closely with Caste Hindus and Muslims. 
                                                 
7 Note that no other caste distinctions can be addressed because the NSS data does not provide a finer caste 
breakdown.   14
We include two variables - HINDU and MUSLIM – to identify Hindu households relative to all 
others and Muslim households relative to all others.  
 
In addition to factors that place households within a particular socio-cultural context, the 
position of the girl child must also depend upon the characteristics of her family – her parent’s 
education and employment characteristics, for example. To take this into account, we include 
the mother’s employment status into our model. We also test for whether a girl’s activities differ 
based on her mother’s employment status. It has often been argued, for instance, that working 
mothers are likely to be more broad-minded regarding their daughter’s activities. It could be the 
case that, having already broken the bounds of patriarchy, working mothers are likely to be less 
sympathetic about rigidly enforced exclusion for their daughters. This, of course, will only be 
the case if mothers are working in the kind of ‘outside’ activities that Bennett (1992) spoke 
about. It is clearly the case that when mothers work on the family farm or within the family 
enterprise, they have neither broken the bounds of patriarchy nor is their employment 
particularly ‘visible’ nor are they likely to be exposed to more broadminded and flexible 
worldviews. Many studies therefore draw a distinction between the impact that mothers who 
work within the household have relative to those who work outside the home even when both 
are contributing to family income. To allow for this distinction, we include two variables to 
distinguish between mothers who are employed within a family enterprise or on a family farm 
(MOTHER_HOMEMP) and those who are employed outside (MOTHER_EMPLOY). If 
employment increases a mother’s bargaining power and decreases the influence of patriarchy, 
we would expect such employment to increase girl’s schooling and decrease her employment. 
However, it may be the case that with the mother working outside the household, the daughter 
may have to substitute for her mother within the home. This may increase her involvement in 
household chores. The net effect is not clear, a priori. 
 
It is clearly not just the employment status of mothers and fathers (FATHER_EMPLOY) that 
has an impact on what girls do. The wages that they earn must also be an important factor in this 
choice. We therefore include mother’s (MOTHER_WAGE) and father’s (FATHER_WAGE) 
wage earnings and a composite household income (OTHER INCOME) variable (that excludes   15
father, mother and child wages) separately in our equations
8. We hypothesise that if the main 
motivation for child work and for non-attendance at school is survival, then an increase in such 
wage and income variables should lead to an increase in school attendance and a decrease in 
child work (both inside and outside the home). However, if such non-attendance is caused by 
the patriarchal instincts of protection, then easing budget constraints through increased incomes 
will not result in an increase in school attendance. It may, in fact, help to draw girls out of the 
labour market but may only shift them into doing household chores instead. If this occurs, then 
an increase in incomes will actually increase girl’s involvement in household chores rather than 
decrease it. These wage and income variables are included as four categorical variables, each 
associated with a quartile of the relevant wage distribution. Such a specification helps us to 
allow for discontinuity and non-monotonicity in the relationship between child work and income 
and we find that our results justify this specification. We also include a variable that identifies 
households above and below the poverty line (POVERTY) and it is expected that if the luxury 
axiom (Basu, 1998) holds, then the probability of children going to work will be lower in 
households above the poverty line.  
 
In addition to the impact of parent’s employment and wages, their education must also influence 
their attitude to their children’s schooling. Rosenzweig and Wolpers, 1982 argue that there is a 
strong inter-generational transfer of educational achievement between parents and children. To 
test for this we include both father’s and mother’s education into our model. We include them as 
3 separate binary categorical variables (EDU_PRIM, EDU_SEC and EDU_TER) that identify 
primary education, secondary education and tertiary education respectively
9. In general, it is 
expected that better educated parents have greater ability and incentive to improve their 
children’s education. They are also more likely to value education and therefore are less likely 
to constrain girls at home instead of sending them to school. It is also expected that education 
helps modernise individuals and cultures and decreases the role of patriarchy, for instance. Of 
course, while the father’s and mother’s education are paramount, the general attitude to 
                                                 
8 A number of parents in our sample work but do not show a wage because they work on family farms or within 
other family enterprises. The other income (OTHER INCOME) variable controls for such income. 
9 There are very few parents with tertiary education, especially amongst mothers in this sample (only .7% of the 
mothers ad 3% of the fathers in the entire sample have tertiary education)   16
education within the household, as evidenced by the overall levels of illiteracy (male and 
female) is also important (HMALEILIT and HFEMILIT). 
 
Household debt (DEBT) is included to control for indebted households, which may be more 
likely to send girls out to work, given all else constant. It has long been agreed that land 
ownership (LAND) can have conflicting effects on child work – increasing the probability of 
work by increasing the opportunities for, and incentives to, child employment. Insofar as land 
ownership reflects the income levels or the asset wealth of households (Bhalotra and Heady, 
2003), however, it may also decrease the probability of girls working. In the context of the girl 
child, however, it is likely to reflect a relatively conservative feudal environment in which girls 
are more likely to be retained at home rather than sent out either to work or to study. 
Landowning households are likely to be more patriarchal than others. 
 
We include age (AGE) and square of age (AGE
2) of the child in all three equations. Our 
estimation also includes two variables – BORDER and ELDGSIB - to take account of family 
and sibling composition. BORDER is included to indicate the birth order of the girls in the 
family (higher birth order indicating younger children). As mentioned earlier, though older 
children may get a larger proportion of a family’s income and be more likely to attend school 
(see Table 2), they are also the ones who are first called upon when things get hard. We would 
expect older girls to work more outside the home than younger girls (if patriarchy was not 
significant) and to work more within the household (if patriarchy was important).  
 
We also include a variable – ELDGSIB – that identifies the oldest girl in each family and 
interacts her with the number of siblings she has. It is expected that girls who have a large 
number of siblings and are the eldest in the family are more likely to be engaged in household 
work than those with fewer siblings or lower down the birth order. This would capture the 
‘double disadvantage’ that older girls function under – being girls and being the eldest. It is, of 
course, not only the number of siblings that a girl has but also the number of older dependants 
who will determine the chores that need to be done within a household. To take this into 
account, we include the number of older dependants (over 60years old) in each household 
(DEP) into our model. While older dependants may increase the number of chores that need to   17
be done, especially if they are infirm or unwell, they may also be able to help out with 
household chores and other reproductive activities. The effect on girl’s activities will depend on 
which of these influences predominate.  
 
Villages that are prosperous (VILPROS) are likely to have higher school attendance by both 




Table 6 presents our results. The highly significant estimates for rho lead us to conclude that 
modelling the 3 choices jointly within a MVP framework is appropriate. The 3 choices are 
jointly made and cannot be studied as separate decisions.  
 
Insert Table 6 
 
As discussed in section III.3, we proxied for the kinship system prevalent in the different states 
in India by including two dummy variable – DMSOUTH and DMNORTH -  into our analysis. 
Our results indicate that within the more flexible and less protective South Indian system, girls 
(like boys) are more likely to go to school and to work inside and outside the home than 
elsewhere in India. In North India, on the other hand, while girls are certainly less likely to be 
working outside the home than elsewhere in India, they are not significantly more or less likely 
to be going to school or even working within the household.  
 
We also find that CASTE significantly decreases the probability of schooling and of household 
chores but increases the probability of outside work. Thus, girls from scheduled castes and tribes 
are more likely to work outside the home than other girls in India and less likely to attend school 
and to do household chores. This seems to bear out the argument that the ‘inside-outside’ 
dichotomy is less strong amongst lower castes in India and also that these groups are less 
patriarchal than higher caste groups in the country. Table 6 also indicates that both Hindu 
(HINDU) and Muslim (MUSLIM) girls attend school less than other children. Both are also 
more likely to do household chores than other girls. However, the probability of working outside   18
the home is higher for Hindu girls than others, indicating possibly a less strict patriarchal system 
amongst Hindu households, relative to Muslim households. 
 
Mother’s employment has quite a complicated effect on girl’s choices. When mothers are 
employed outside the home (MOTHER_EMPLOY = 1), then girls are less likely to go to school 
and significantly more likely to do household chores. Thus, girls substitute for their mothers at 
home. This rejects the notion at least in rural India that when mothers are employed outside the 
home, they are likely to be less patriarchal and more broad-minded regarding the importance of 
schooling. It points instead to the expedient option – girls help out when their mothers are not at 
home. On the other hand, when mothers are employed within the home (MOTHER_HOMEMP) 
(and therefore within the bounds of patriarchy) then daughters are significantly more likely to 
also be working with them. In this case, daughter’s labour is clearly complementary to mother’s 
labour. This seems to confirm the findings of Nieuwenhuys (1994) and Cohen (2001)
10 that 
mothers often work with their daughters. This finding is reinforced by our results on mother’s 
wages (MOTHER_WAGE 2-4). We find that an increase in mother’s wages increases the 
probability of girl’s working. The complementarity between mother’s and daughter’s 
employment can be seen from the fact that as mother’s wage increases, so does the probability 
of girl’s employment. 
 
On the other hand, we find that father’s employment (FATHER_EMPLOY) increases the 
probability of schooling and marginally decreases the probability of work. However, it does not 
significantly influence the probability of household chores. We also find that any increase in 
father’s wages (FATHER_WAGE_2-4) (from quartile 2 to 3 to 4) and in OTHER INCOME 1-4 
leads to an increase in the probability of schooling and a decrease in the probability of outside 
work undertaken by girls. Interestingly, however, we find that it is also associated with an 
increase in the probability of household chores being the principal activity undertaken by girls. 
This seems to indicate that while some families send their daughters to school when their 
incomes increase, others retain them at home to do household chores. This only reverts in the 
                                                 
10 ‘My mother is a coir worker and when I am off from school we can beat together 150 or even 200 husks a day. 
Otherwise, I beat 50 husks before leaving and she will beat 50 more while I am away……..I have to fetch water, 
wash dishes and light the oven…..and also sweep the yard and look after the babies and go to school. I do all this 
after I come home from school at four O’clock.’ (Nieuwenhuys, 1994, p.73).   19
top income quartile when father’s wages do not significantly increase household chores. This 
finding seems to reinforce our earlier hypothesis that the patriarchal system will decrease the 
probability of outside work and increase the probability of household work for girls. In contrast 
to this, however, we find that while households below the poverty line (POVERTY) are 
significantly less likely to send their daughters to school they are significantly more likely to 
require them to do chores within the household.  
 
Table 6 indicates that both the linear and quadratic terms in age (AGE and AGE2) are 
significant for SCHOOL and WORK in the MVP model. Thus, we can conclude that initially as 
age increases girls go more to school and work more both inside and outside the home. Beyond 
a certain point, however, the probability of schooling decreases with age and so does that of 
outside work. This might reflect parent’s reluctance to send girls outside the home as they grow 
older and therefore more ‘vulnerable’. The probability of household work remains the same 
after reaching a maximum i.e. there is no significant increase or decrease after a certain age. In 
line with our expectations, the estimates suggest that the birth order (BORDER) of girls is a 
significant factor determining the choices open to the girl child. The MVP model finds that it is 
a negative and significant coefficient for school implying that higher birth order girls (i.e. 
younger girls) are less likely to go to school. They are, however, not significantly less likely to 
do household chores. We also find that where the eldest girl child has a larger number of 
siblings, she is significantly less likely to go to school and significantly more likely to go to 
work or do household chores. However, this effect is largely offset by the effect of living in a 
household with a larger number of older dependants (DEP). Girls living in such households 
have a higher probability of going to school and a lower probability of work and of doing 
household chores. This is not surprising because in these households, older dependants like 
grandmothers can do a number of household chores to keep the household running when both 
parents are out at work.  
 
Father’s and Mother’s education have a significant impact on the probability of schooling, work 
and chores for girls in our estimates. We find that fathers with secondary 
(FATHER_EDU_SEC) or tertiary (FATHER_EDU_TER) education are less likely to have their 
daughters doing only household chores or working than fathers with no education. They are   20
therefore associated with an increase in the probability of schooling for girls. However, there is 
a discontinuity in this relationship because father’s primary education does not influence girl’s 
schooling. In the case of mother’s education, there is no such discontinuity. Both primary 
(MOTHER_EDU_PRIM) and secondary education (MOTHER_EDU_SEC) seem to have a 
significant and positive impact on girl’s schooling. The secondary education of mothers also 
seems to have a significant negative impact on the probability of girls going out to work and 
doing household chores. Our results indicate that only mothers with secondary education have a 
significant negative impact on the probability of girls doing household chores. The tertiary 
education of mothers (MOTHER_EDU_TER) does not seem to influence any of the options
11. 
The levels of male and female illiteracy (HMALEILIT and HFEMILIT) within the household 
decrease the probability of girl’s schooling significantly while increasing their probability of 
work and household chores. This may suggest that when the household has more illiterate 
members, the socio-cultural environment is likely to be more conservative and the emphasis on 
girl’s schooling will be minimal. 
 
The externality effect that village prosperity has on child schooling and work is captured by the 
village prosperity variable (VILPROS). Our results confirm that any increase in village 
prosperity will have a positive impact on the probability of girl’s schooling and a negative 




What do our results tell us about the probability of girls doing household chores? What 
increases this probability? What decreases it? Are household chores determined by the same 
factors as paid employment? And if so, can we aggregate the two, as some studies have done?  
 
To begin with, we tested the possibility (within the MNL methodology) that work and chores 
were determined by such similar factors that they could be aggregated together, as Cigno and 
Rosati (2000) state. A likelihood ratio test, however, rejects this hypothesis at the 1% level (with 
                                                 
11 A possible explanation for this could be that there were very few mothers in the rural household sample who had 
tertiary education (.7%)   21
a chi-square value of 950.02 with 54 degrees of freedom) in our sample. Therefore, it is clear 
that we cannot estimate work and chores as being the same. This is not surprising given the fact 
that many factors (like father’s wages and caste) may increase the probability of household 
chores but decrease the probability of work outside the home. In terms of our earlier discussion, 
patriarchy will encourage girl’s participation in household chores but will discourage their 
involvement in work outside the home.  
 
Our results lead us to conclude that as incomes (father’s wages and other household incomes) 
increase, girls will be taken out of work and sent back to school. However, they also indicate 
that while this is happening, there is an increase in the number of girls who stay at home to do 
household chores. We find that while significantly less outside work is done by girls in North 
India relative to girls elsewhere in India, they do not seem to attend more school or do more 
chores. In South India, on the other hand, the probability of doing household chores is greater 
than elsewhere in India. We also find that while SC/ST girls are less likely to go to school and to 
do household chores, they are significantly more likely to do outside work. In Muslim 
households, girls do more household chores than in others but do not work significantly more 
outside the home. Overall therefore, we cannot reject the notion that patriarchy plays a very 
important role in determining the activities of girls in rural India. In this context, economic 
solutions including an improvement in household incomes, are unlikely to improve girl’s school 
attendance.    22
Table 1: School, Work and Household Chores Done by Children in Rural Households in India 
(For age group 5-15 yrs) 
 
Table 1-A  
  Girls  (Number)  Girls (Frequency)  Boys (number)  Boys 
School 26388  60.42  37053  73.85 
Work 2353  05.39  3674  07.32 




 Oldest  Girl Oldest  Boy 
   Frequency  Percent Frequency Percent
School 16575 58.70  23585 74.42
Work 2024 8.40  3169 10.08
Hhchores 4099 14.51  274 0.86
 
Table 2: Level of education of the children in rural households according to birth order 
  GIRLS BOYS 
   First   Second  Third   Fourth   Fifth   Sixth 
7 and 
above   First   Second  Third   Fourth   Fifth   Sixth 
7 and 
above 
Missing                                           
Illiterate  35.58  37.08  42.90  43.60 45.41 50.91  53.85 22.53  27.94  35.83  42.16 39.13 41.77 50.00 
Below  primary  32.51  43.54  46.30  48.15 45.95 43.64  41.03 37.17  50.53  51.86  50.28 54.11 54.43 28.57 
Primary  19.13  14.54  7.37  4.56 3.24 5.45  2.56  23.82  16.23  8.28  3.27 2.90 1.27 9.52 
Middle 9.79  2.73  0.67  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.00  13.36  3.21  1.06  0.68 0.97 0.00 0.00 
Secondary 1.29  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 1.43  0.09  0.08  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other 1.61  2.00  2.76  3.45  5.41  0.00  2.56 1.54  1.97  2.80  3.61 2.90 2.53  11.90 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 100 100  100 100  100  100  100 100   23
Table 3: Pattern of Domestic Activities Undertaken by Boys and Girls in Rural India 
DOMESTIC DUTIES  BOYS  GIRLS  TOTAL 
   Number % of Total  Number % of Total    
Kitchen Garden Maintenance  79 10.2 694 89.8 773 
HH Poultry  102 6.0 1594 94.0 1696 
Free collection of Fish  143 11.3 1123 88.7 1266 
Firewood collection  203 8.5 2190 91.5 2393 
Housing paddy  52 7.1 677 92.9 729 
Grinding food grains  35 4.8 699 95.2 734 
Preparation of gur  8 5.9 127 94.1 135 
Meat/fish preservation  21 12.5 147 87.5 168 
Making baskets  14 6.8 191 93.2 205 
Preparation of dung cakes  85 3.3 2483 96.7 2568 
Sewing/tailoring  9 1.5 582 98.5 591 
Tutoring of own/other children  1 1.0 96 99.0 97 
Carry water  220 6.7 3065 93.3 3285 
Carry water from other village  20 11.4 156 88.6 176 
 
Table 4: Reasons for not currently attending school 
Reasons for not currently attending 
school       
 Frequency Percent 
Too young to go to school  4133 4.4
Unable to cope  1221 1.3
Schooling facility not available  738 0.8
Inorder to participate in hh activity  1559 1.7
Inorder to do salaried work  391 0.4
To take care of siblings  506 0.5
To attend hh chores  397 0.4
By preference  255 0.3
cannot afford  3928 4.2





Table 5: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Test :Hausman Test 
 Omitted Option GIRLS      Base category 
School  342.23   Prob>chi2 =0.0000  None 
Work  -13.51 chi2<0  School 
HHwork  68.7   Prob>chi2 =0.9912  School 
Both  -11.47 chi2<0  School 
None  34.72  Prob>chi2 =     1.0000  School   24
Table 6: Multivariate Probit Results 
 
  SCHOOL  WORK  CHORES 
Variable Coeff  b/St.Er.  Coeff  b/St.Er. Coeff b/St.Er. 
             
Constant -0.150  -0.247  -4.366  -5.084 -4.817 -6.639 
AGE 0.327  3.375  0.402  2.957  0.297 2.623 
AGE2 -0.019  -4.775  -0.010  -1.813 -0.006 -1.345 
BORDER -0.119  -3.939  -0.052 -1.045 -0.058 -1.443 
ELDGSIB -0.092  -14.771  0.030  3.118  0.041 5.373 
DEP 0.276  15.138  -0.167  -6.226 -0.099 -4.512 
FATHER_EDU_PRI 0.030  1.044 0.074  1.784  -0.056 -1.574 
FATHER-EDU_SEC 0.284 7.987  -0.270  -4.476 -0.199 -4.401 
FATHER_EDU_TER 0.373 5.488  -0.278  -2.086 -0.252 -2.645 
MOTHER_EDU_PRI 0.150 3.212  -0.214  -2.558 -0.057 -0.982 
MOTHER_EDU_SEC 0.361  5.530  -0.249  -2.171 -0.325 -3.716 
MOTHER_EDU_TER -0.038  -0.261  0.009  0.035 0.157 0.878 
HFEMILIT -1.434  -22.619  0.622  7.918  0.611 9.473 
HMALEILI -0.369  -18.933  0.260  11.040 0.055 2.400 
HINDU -0.348  -9.248  0.263  4.391  0.299 5.661 
MUSLIM -0.591  -12.146  0.017 0.214  0.472 7.435 
CASTE -0.196  -8.215  0.116  3.800  -0.069 -2.483 
DEBT -0.117  -3.368  0.114  2.719  -0.052 -1.371 
LAND 0.069  1.148  -0.190  -2.625 -0.002 -0.024 
MOTHER_EMPLOY -0.760 -2.332  -0.054 -0.110 0.601 2.047 
MOTHER_HOMEMP 0.080  1.626  0.358  5.836  0.012 0.213 
MOTHER_WAGE 2  0.048  0.872  0.229  3.769  -0.119 -1.891 
MOTHER-WAGE 3  0.118  1.717  0.146  2.013  0.001 0.017 
MOTHER_WAGE 4  -0.116  -1.978  -0.047 -0.603 0.117 1.793 
FATHER_EMPLOY 0.177  4.965  -0.084  -1.924 -0.035 -0.908 
FATHER_WAGE 2  0.185  2.832  -0.674  -9.908 0.296 3.977 
FATHER_WAGE 3  0.349  4.993  -0.794  -10.807 0.312 3.963 
FATHER-WAGE 4  0.763  9.948  -1.086  -12.447 0.085 0.929 
OTHER INCOME 1  0.166  2.457  -0.600  -8.609 0.362 4.619 
OTHER INCOME 2  0.465  6.695  -0.786  -10.880 0.294 3.598 
OTHER INCOME 3  0.505  6.740  -0.926  -11.533 0.236 2.602 
OTHER INCOME 4  0.512  6.498  -1.053  -12.157 0.289 3.024 
POVERTY -0.177  -5.269  -0.068 -1.470 0.109 2.557 
VILPROS 0.218  9.386  -0.090  -2.699 -0.095 -3.477 
DMSOUTH 0.086  1.662  0.330  5.189  0.128 2.171 
DMNORTH 0.001  0.015  -0.188  -2.302 0.033 0.543 
             
R(01,02) -0.594  -15.787        
R(01,03) -0.731  -33.523        
R(02,03) -0.093  -2.063          25
Appendix 1: Variable Description. 
Variable  Description  
AGE  Age of the child; continuous variable 
AGE2  Age*Age 
SEX  Gender of the child, coded 0=Boys; 1=Girls 
BORDER 
Birth order of the child; ranked variable; higher ranks indicate younger 
children  (eg.oldest child is ranked 1) 
ELDGSIB  Eldest girl * the number of siblings the child has 
FATHER_EDU_PRI  Father’s Education; coded: 1=primary education; else=0 
FATHER_EDU_SEC  Father’s Education; coded: 1=secondary education, else=0 
FATHER_EDU_TER  Father’s Education; coded: 1=tertiary education; else=0 
FATHER_EMPLOY  Father’s employment; Binary variable coded 1= work, else 0 
MOTHER_EDU_PRI  Mother’s Education; coded: 1=primary education; else=0 
MOTHER_EDU_SEC  Mother’s Education; coded: 1=secondary education, else=0 
MOTHER_EDU_TER  Mother’s Education; coded: 1=tertiary education; else=0 
MOTHER_EMPLOY 
Mother’s employment (only refers to mothers who are employed outside 
home); coded 1= work, else= 0 
MOTHER_HOMEMP 
This indicates mothers who are employed in family enterprises and on family 
farms) ; coded 1=self employed, else=o 
HINDU  Dummy variable, coded Hindu=1, else= 0 
MUSLIM  Dummy variable, coded Muslim=1, else= 0 
OTHER INCOME 1-4 
Total income-(mother wage + father wage + child wage), divided into 
quintiles, and each a dummy variable to represent whether the household 
falls into that quintile or not. 
CASTE  Dummy variable, coded scheduled caste/tribe=1, else=0 
DEBT 
Code indicating whether the household is in debt or not; coded 0 = no debt, 
else =1. 
FEMILIT 
Household female illiteracy i.e. the number of females who are illiterate as a 
proportion of all females in the household. 
MALEILIT 
Household male illiteracy i.e. the number of males who are illiterate as a 
proportion of all males in the household. 
LAND  Dummy variable, coded 1 if the household owns land, else=0 
DEP  Number of dependants in the household. 
POVERTY  Households living above the poverty, coded 0=above poverty line, else=1 
FATHER_WAGE 2-4 
Father’s wage divided into quartiles and a dummy variable to represent 
whether the father of the household falls into that quartile or not. 
MOTHER_WAGE 2-4 
Mother’s wage divided into quartiles and a dummy variable to represent 
whether the mother of the household falls into that quartile or not. 
VILPROSP  Village wages (male & female), code 1=above average and 0=below average
DMSOUTH 
This was a dummy variable which was coded 1 for all southern states that 
had a similar kinship system, else coded 0 (this classification was adopted 
from Dyson and Moore (1983) 
DMNORTH 
This was a dummy variable which was coded 1 for all northern states that 
had a similar kinship system, else coded 0 (this classification was adopted 
from Dyson and Moore (1983)   26
Appendix 2: Multinomial Logit Results- Marginal Effects 
           
Variable  Coefficient    b/St.Er. Elasticity 
SCHOOL         
Constant 0.914337 3.953    
AGE  -0.01321 -0.359 -0.25833 
AGE2  -0.00158 -1.069 -0.38851 
BORDER  -0.04379 -3.676 -0.08492 
ELDGSIB -0.03754 -12.947 -0.15351 
FATHER_EDU_PRI  0.019914 1.818 0.004697 
FATHER_EDU_SEC  0.118646 8.891 0.023002 
FATHER_EDU_TER  0.162133 5.814 0.00911 
FATHER_EMPLOY  0.071244 5.126 0.10332 
MOTHER_EDU_PRI  0.072193 4.061 0.0093 
MOTHER_EDU_SEC  0.17461 6.817 0.016355 
MOTHER_EDU_TER 0.025573 0.413 0.000304 
MOTHER_EMPLOY  0.029769 1.594 0.002487 
HINDU -0.11713 -8.046 -0.14854 
MUSLIM -0.16918 -9.157 -0.02671 
DEBT 0.05039 3.874 0.151352 
HFEMILIT -0.51158 -22.008 -0.25042 
HMALEILI -0.14553 -17.103 -0.15237 
LAND 0.024495 1.115 0.037502 
OTHER INCOME 1  0.056492 2.26 0.013643 
OTHER INCOME 2  0.176513 6.854 0.045517 
OTHER INCOME 3  0.200201 7.282 0.054062 
OTHER INCOME 4  0.202541 7.01 0.057554 
MOTHER_WAGE 2  0.029081 1.389 0.00192 
MOTHER_WAGE 3  0.042379 1.728 0.001843 
MOTHER_WAGE 4  -0.02932 -1.282 -0.00166 
FATHER_WAGE 2  0.049969 2.058 0.008066 
FATHER_WAGE 3  0.11269 4.379 0.01742 
FATHER_WAGE 4  0.282574 9.977 0.054295 
DEP 0.02441 6 0.032903 
POVERTY -0.06991 -5.596 -0.06314 
VILPROSP  0.086372 10.042 0.04812 
DMSOUTH 0.077958 3.746 0.00503 
DMNORTH 0.006405 0.306 0.00034 
WORK         
Constant -0.36914 -3.635    
AGE  0.033842 2.129 6.349634 
AGE2  -0.00046 -0.735 -1.08906 
BORDER  0.005375 0.939 0.1 
ELDGSIB 0.008129 6.73 0.318891   27
FATHER_EDU_PRI  0.006274 1.37 0.014194 
FATHER_EDU_SEC  -0.03553 -5.035 -0.06607 
FATHER_EDU_TER  -0.04102 -2.68 -0.02211 
FATHER_EMPLOY  -0.01472 -2.971 -0.20471 
MOTHER_EDU_PRI  -0.01387 -1.48 -0.01714 
MOTHER_EDU_SEC  -0.02074 -1.537 -0.01864 
MOTHER_EDU_TER -0.00231 -0.07 -0.00026 
MOTHER_EMPLOY  0.043105 6.828 0.034536 
HINDU 0.03658 5.361 0.444948 
MUSLIM 0.001539 0.167 0.00233 
DEBT -0.01897 -4.078 -0.54651 
HFEMILIT 0.103061 11.768 0.483916 
HMALEILI 0.040499 14.396 0.406741 
LAND -0.02851 -3.573 -0.41874 
OTHER INCOME 1  -0.07163 -9.064 -0.16592 
OTHER INCOME 2  -0.10124 -12.031 -0.25042 
OTHER INCOME 3  -0.11846 -12.666 -0.30683 
OTHER INCOME 4  -0.13314 -13.077 -0.36289 
MOTHER_WAGE 2  0.018374 2.759 0.011637 
MOTHER_WAGE 3  0.012148 1.505 0.005068 
MOTHER_WAGE 4  -0.00706 -0.779 -0.00383 
FATHER_WAGE 2  -0.07523 -9.847 -0.11648 
FATHER_WAGE 3  -0.09367 -11.373 -0.13889 
FATHER_WAGE 4  -0.13149 -12.774 -0.24235 
DEP -0.00921 -5.069 -0.11902 
POVERTY -0.00278 -0.529 -0.02409 
VILPROSP  -0.01597 -4.311 -0.08532 
DMSOUTH 0.032544 4.984 0.020142 
DMNORTH -0.0247 -2.615 -0.01258 
HHWORK         
Constant -0.72666 -5.598    
AGE  0.051187 2.52 6.837884 
AGE2  -0.00085 -1.063 -1.43194 
BORDER  -0.00962 -1.291 -0.12737 
ELDGSIB 0.007273 4.973 0.203124 
FATHER_EDU_PRI  -0.00829 -1.405 -0.01336 
FATHER_EDU_SEC  -0.02666 -3.548 -0.03529 
FATHER_EDU_TER  -0.0291 -1.925 -0.01117 
FATHER_EMPLOY  -0.00821 -1.151 -0.08129 
MOTHER_EDU_PRI  0.010192 1.065 0.008967 
MOTHER_EDU_SEC  -0.02856 -1.958 -0.01827 
MOTHER_EDU_TER 0.038197 1.301 0.003096 
MOTHER_EMPLOY  0.008725 0.909 0.004977 
HINDU 0.058902 6.472 0.510109 
MUSLIM 0.0944 9.038 0.101792   28
HHINDEBT 0.000269 0.039 0.005511 
HFEMILIT 0.128407 11.552 0.429275 
HMALEILI 0.027286 6.965 0.195113 
LAND -0.01673 -1.475 -0.17498 
OTHER INCOME 1  0.035025 2.669 0.057765 
OTHER INCOME 2  0.01231 0.903 0.02168 
OTHER INCOME 3  0.000334 0.023 0.000617 
OTHER INCOME 4  0.011605 0.743 0.022521 
MOTHER_WAGE 2  -0.01705 -1.487 -0.00769 
MOTHER_WAGE 3  0.004193 0.335 0.001245 
MOTHER_WAGE 4  0.012265 1.019 0.004731 
FATHER_WAGE 2  0.02762 2.157 0.030449 
FATHER_WAGE 3  0.018778 1.36 0.019825 
FATHER_WAGE 4  -0.01914 -1.226 -0.02511 
DEP -0.00106 -0.493 -0.00979 
POVERTY 0.017598 2.575 0.108546 
VILPROSP  -0.01793 -3.887 -0.06822 
DMSOUTH 0.026657 2.854 0.011747 
DMNORTH 0.005736 0.544 0.00208 
BOTH         
Constant -0.57017 -9.691    
AGE  0.090572 9.781 57.959 
AGE2  -0.00365 -9.815 -29.4003 
BORDER  -0.00216 -0.743 -0.13712 
ELDGSIB -0.00086 -1.153 -0.11538 
FATHER_EDU_PRI  -0.00144 -0.529 -0.01115 
FATHER_EDU_SEC  -0.0024 -0.794 -0.0152 
FATHER_EDU_TER  0.010542 2.388 0.019377 
FATHER_EMPLOY  0.00517 1.303 0.245289 
MOTHER_EDU_PRI  -0.00575 -1.545 -0.02424 
MOTHER_EDU_SEC  -0.0117 -2.311 -0.03584 
MOTHER_EDU_TER 0.000138 0.014 .536305D-04 
MOTHER_EMPLOY  0.015183 4.968 0.041491 
HINDU -0.00976 -3.796 -0.40486 
MUSLIM -0.01998 -4.357 -0.10319 
DEBT -0.00026 -0.076 -0.02603 
HFEMILIT -0.01248 -2.133 -0.19983 
HMALEILI -0.00228 -1.012 -0.07813 
LAND 0.004649 0.751 0.232849 
OTHER INCOME 1  -0.01477 -2.486 -0.1167 
OTHER INCOME 2  -0.01152 -1.937 -0.09717 
OTHER INCOME 3  -0.01597 -2.528 -0.14112 
OTHER INCOME 4  -0.01753 -2.689 -0.16293 
MOTHER_WAGE 2  0.007323 1.495 0.015817 
MOTHER_WAGE 3  0.002519 0.407 0.003583   29
MOTHER_WAGE 4  -0.02198 -2.482 -0.04063 
FATHER_WAGE 2  -0.01405 -2.469 -0.07422 
FATHER_WAGE 3  -0.01862 -3.039 -0.09419 
FATHER_WAGE 4  -0.02725 -4.087 -0.17126 
DEP -0.00186 -1.758 -0.08223 
POVERTY -0.00854 -2.752 -0.25241 
VILPROSP  0.000995 0.496 0.01813 
DMSOUTH -0.00195 -0.384 -0.00411 
DMNORTH -0.00443 -0.754 -0.0077 
NONE         
Constant 0.751631 4.351    
AGE  -0.16239 -5.906 -10.3831 
AGE2  0.006546 5.901 5.263979 
BORDER  0.05019 5.845 0.318188 
ELDGSIB 0.022998 10.634 0.307438 
FEDUPRI -0.01645 -1.933 -0.01268 
FEDUSEC -0.05406 -4.881 -0.03426 
FEDUTER -0.10256 -4.008 -0.01884 
FATHER_EMPLOY  -0.05349 -5.598 -0.25357 
MOTHER_EDU_PRI  -0.06276 -3.876 -0.02643 
MOTHER_EDU_SEC  -0.11361 -4.575 -0.03479 
MOTHER_EDU_TER -0.0616 -0.997 -0.00239 
MOTHER_EMPLOY  -0.09678 -5.981 -0.02642 
HINDU 0.031411 2.697 0.130202 
MUSLIM 0.09322 6.669 0.048112 
DEBT -0.03143 -3.436 -0.30853 
HFEMILIT 0.29259 17.353 0.468173 
HMALEILI 0.080025 14.038 0.273885 
LAND 0.016105 0.95 0.080596 
OTHER INCOME 1  -0.00512 -0.287 -0.00404 
OTHER INCOME 2  -0.07606 -4.097 -0.06412 
OTHER INCOME 3  -0.0661 -3.28 -0.05835 
OTHER INCOME 4  -0.06348 -2.933 -0.05897 
MOTHER_WAGE 2  -0.03773 -2.547 -0.00814 
MOTHER_WAGE 3  -0.06124 -3.384 -0.00871 
MOTHER_WAGE 4  0.046097 2.857 0.008511 
FATHER_WAGE 2  0.011695 0.673 0.006171 
FATHER_WAGE 3  -0.01918 -1.038 -0.00969 
FATHER_WAGE 4  -0.1047 -4.894 -0.06576 
DEP -0.01228 -4.028 -0.05409 
POVERTY 0.063635 6.484 0.18787 
VILPROSP  -0.05347 -7.943 -0.09738 
DMSOUTH -0.13521 -7.353 -0.02852 
DMNORTH 0.016992 1.118 0.00295   30
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